University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2020

Mastering the Cases and Delineating the Role of the Supreme
Court
Sanford Levinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Levinson, Sanford, "Mastering the Cases and Delineating the Role of the Supreme Court" (2020).
Constitutional Commentary. 1197.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1197

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

35.1 LEVINSON

6/19/2020 11:49 AM

MASTERING THE CASES AND
DELINEATING THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT1
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.2 University Press of
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth).
Sanford Levinson3
The first thing readers of Keith Whittington’s remarkable
book should notice is its title, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress
from the Founding to the Present. What he has done is to carefully
read and evaluate 1308 cases decided over the entire history of the
United States Supreme Court, from the beginning until the end of
the 2017 Term in the spring of 2018, all of which involve “judicial
review of acts of Congress.” Whittington does not consider any of
the myriad of cases, most famously including Brown v. Board of
Education, invalidating state legislation. Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously opined that “I do not think that the United States would
come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress
void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not
make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”4 In
some ways, Whittington’s book is a wonderful examination of the
validity of Holmes’s assertion with regard to Acts of Congress.
Of the cases considered, 345 “involve invalidations or
limitations of statutory provisions [based on a desire to avoid a
constitutional conflict], while another 963 upheld federal
1. This article is a lightly revised version of my Foreword to KEITH WHITTINGTON,
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO
THE PRESENT (2019). My thanks to the Press for permission to republish the Foreword.
2. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
3. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
4. O. W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295–96
(1920).
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legislation against constitutional challenge” (p. 25). I have been
teaching constitutional law for over forty years, and I can confess
that I have not read the multitude of cases surveyed by
Whittington; an unscientific check with colleagues who also teach
the subject leads me to believe that I am not an outlier. The late
University of Chicago Law Professor David Currie is famous for
having read every case while writing his multivolume study of the
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, but he may
well be close to unique. And, as much to the point, he was not
testing hypotheses in the way that the social scientist Whittington
is.
So Whittington is presenting a book almost certainly
unprecedented in its scope and ambition. In addition to Currie’s
almost literally idiosyncratic enterprise, there may be “period”
histories of the Supreme Court whose authors read all of the cases
within what now seems a relatively brief period. But none of the
more comprehensive one-volume general histories can claim the
authority that Whittington evokes on almost every page. It is
unimaginable that any professional academic, whether teaching
law, political science, or American political history, will not treat
this book as an indispensable source. But, fortunately, it is also
written in a manner that should interest the general reader as well
who wants to know how important the Supreme Court has really
been throughout the course of American history. It is altogether
fitting that Whittington was announced in November 2019 as the
recipient of the Thomas M. Cooley Book Prize, and I suspect that
will be only the first such award.
One often reads stories in the press—and occasionally even
in the academic literature—proclaiming that Sandra Day
O’Connor and then Anthony Kennedy were the most important
political decisionmakers in America. In their role as the “median
justices” on the Court, they often provided the “swing votes” in
5–4 decisions otherwise comprised of four highly predictable
conservatives and four equally predictable liberals. For those who
unthinkingly quoted Tocqueville’s observation, during the 1830s,
that all political issues in America ended up being legalized and
ultimately decided by the judiciary, this meant a) that what the
Supreme Court did was surpassingly important and b) that the
“median justice” along the spectrum of the Court was especially
important. Tocqueville’s first observation may have been true:
Americans do have a tendency to treat political issues as raising
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questions about what the Constitution permits or prohibits. But
he was almost certainly wrong in his second observation. Many
extraordinarily important issues never come before the Court or,
should a lawyer be so bold as to bring a case, they are dismissed
on a variety of grounds that allow the Court to avoid issuing a
decision. As Frederick Schauer notably demonstrated well over a
decade ago in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, the issues
that most Americans tell pollsters are principal sources of concern
and anguish rarely come before the judiciary, including, most
vividly, decisions that involve basic issues of war and peace or
arguable “solutions” to problems posed by a globalized economy
or global warming.5 Even if many more constitutional challenges
are filed regarding legislation simply because Congress, at least
until recently, was passing so many more acts, that does not at all
mean that the Supreme Court will be receptive, or even choose to
grant arguments the dignity of a full hearing. The Court has
steadily been reducing the actual number of cases it is willing to
decide, so that in recent years it has issued opinions in only
roughly 70–75 cases, many of them of interest only to the litigants
or specialists in arcane areas of the law.
As Whittington demonstrates, echoing an earlier analysis by
the late Charles Black, the principal role of the Supreme Court
over our history is to legitimate actions, particularly by the
national government, rather than to strike them down. My own
beloved mentor, the late Robert G. McCloskey, once wrote that
“the essential business of the Supreme Court is to say ‘no’ to
government.”6 For better or worse, this is almost certainly false,
especially if by “government” one means the national
government, the focus of Whittington’s attention. It may be true
that the significance of the legitimation that comes through saying
“yes” depends on the possibility that it might instead offer a
McCloskeyan “no,” but one ought not confuse the possibility with
the overall likelihood of judicial action. The most truly “essential”
business of the Court has been legitimation, not invalidation.
It is worth asking, though, under which circumstances the
Court can successfully legitimate governmental actions that are
opposed by significant sectors of the public. The Court itself once
5. See Frederick Schauer, The Court’s Agenda—And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (2006).
6. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5–6 (Robert G.
McCloskey ed., 1957).
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noted that Lincoln did not sue for a judicial declaration that
secession by South Carolina was illegal; nor, of course, had James
Buchanan, who agreed with Lincoln that secession was in fact
unconstitutional. The reason, presumably, was simple: Even if one
could imagine a federal court in 1861 issuing such a decree, it was
unimaginable that South Carolina would in fact honor it, any
more than Lincoln chose to honor the declaration by Chief Justice
Taney in Ex parte Merryman7 that he was without power
unilaterally to suspend habeas corpus, a power not even enjoyed
by the British Monarch (and granted Lincoln by Congress only in
1863). If anything, Lincoln’s example—and the veneration
accorded our 16th President—has served to delegitimate Taney
and to legitimate presidential power. “Legitimacy” is a complex
process, especially once we realize that it requires actual
acceptance by target populations rather than what Madison might
have dismissed as a “parchment barrier” of a judicial decision per
se.
Whittington couches his book as in some way a test of Robert
Dahl’s famous propositions: first, that the Supreme Court must be
understood as a basically political institution, and, secondly, that
this means one must strive to understand the special
circumstances under which the Court will invalidate a
congressional act.8 After all, no one joins the Court without the
approval of the dominant political coalition at a given time,
consisting of the President, doing the nominating, and then the
Senate, doing the confirming. Thus, Dahl suggested, invalidation
was most likely when a Court representing a new coalition would
be considering legislation passed some years ago by the ruling
coalition then exercising political hegemony. By definition, what
would be rare would be the invalidation of recent legislation,
unless there was what might be termed a “regime lag,” whereby
the Court was still dominated by veterans of the now-supplanted
coalition who would valiantly, if often unsuccessfully, try to stave
off the reality of the fact that elections really do have
consequences. Perhaps it should not be surprising that
Whittington demonstrates serious flaws in Dahl’s argument, given
that his article, now well over a half-century old, was the first
serious attempt to offer an empirical analysis of the circumstances
7. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).
8. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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under which the Court would invalidate acts of Congress.
Even if Whittington demonstrates that the Court is more of
an active political player than Dahl might be read to have
suggested, he nonetheless reinforces the position taken by Gerald
Rosenberg in his classic book, The Hollow Hope, which suggested
that political activists were wrong to put too much hope in the
Court to deviate very much from the general drift of American
public opinion or, perhaps more to the point, the views of political
elites who in fact dominate the American political system by
winning elections and taking office.9 Rosenberg was writing
especially about progressive forces who hoped the Court would
be an all-important ally and, therefore, make it far less important
to win actual political victories in elections and then legislatures.
But it can apply as well to conservatives who hoped, as in the
1930s, that the Court could prevent the reforms of the New Deal
or, more recently, strike down the hated Affordable Care Act
that, among other things, threatens to entrench medical care as an
“entitlement” in the same sense that has become true of Social
Security, one of the key pieces of New Deal legislation. Other
targets of conservative ire, including the use of racial preferences
in a variety of contexts or the protection of reproductive choice,
have much more to do with state legislation and the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment than with the domain of national
legislative power. Perhaps the ascent of Brett Kavanaugh to the
Court to replace Anthony Kennedy will invalidate the premise of
this last sentence regarding the hesitation to limit national power,
but Whittington’s own analysis allows us to wonder, especially
given potential election results.
It would be a mistake, which Whittington certainly does not
make, to dismiss the Court as unimportant. That would be
carrying revisionism much too far! What is crucial, both for the
academic scholar and the general reader simply trying better to
understand the American political system, is to get a well-founded
sense of those occasions in which the Court has acted in a fairly
determinative manner, with regard to other political forces, and
when, on the contrary, it has basically chosen to keep its powder
dry by refusing to engage in fights that it believes it cannot win.
Here Whittington is invaluable.

9. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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In addition to the grand theme of trying to figure out how the
Court has navigated potential conflicts with Congress over the
past 225 years, Whittington offers a host of valuable insights along
the way. Begin only with the hoary story that Marbury v.
Madison10 “created” judicial review and that, after the 1803
decision in that case, the Court did not engage in another such act
until the notorious Dred Scott case in 1857.11 Both are untrue.
Whittington notes first that there were several cases before
Marbury that presupposed the power of the Court to invalidate
congressional acts thought to be in violation of the Constitution,
even if the Court came up with the “happy ending” that no such
invalidation was required in the case at hand (pp. 38, 60–77).
Marbury, of course, was different, though it is essential to note
that the actual statute invalidated was remarkably unimportant,
save in terms of the political actualities of the moment. The real
question was whether the Court would order Secretary of State
James Madison to deliver a judicial commission to William
Marbury in defiance of the determination of President Thomas
Jefferson not to do so. The nascent Court could scarcely
countenance open defiance or, just as ominously, the prospect of
Jeffersonian efforts at impeachment as a means of disciplining an
out-of-control Federalist Court determined not to recognize the
so-called “Revolution of 1800” that displaced the prior Federalist
hegemony. What was easiest was to declare that the Court had no
power to order the delivery because the statute allegedly giving it
such power was unconstitutional. And, a week later, as
Whittington notes, the Court almost laconically upheld the ability
of the Jeffersonian Congress in effect to purge the federal
judiciary of a number of Federalist judges simply by repealing the
Act, passed in the waning days of the Adams Administration, to
create an intermediate tier of Federal Circuit Courts, whose
members had been quickly appointed and confirmed by the lameduck Federalist Congress (pp. 79–80). It is an unfortunate truth
that this second case, Stuart v. Laird,12 is rarely taught alongside
Marbury, even though it is surely at least as important if one is
trying to understand the actual role (or ability) of the Supreme
Court to resist an insistent political movement.
But what about the period 1803–1857? Building on the
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
11. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
12. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803).
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valuable insights of Mark Graber (with whom Whittington has coedited, along with Howard Gillman, a path-breaking casebook on
Whittington
American
constitutional
development13),
demonstrates that there were a number of cases involving
statutory interpretation in which one can understand the
interpretations only against the background assumption that a
contrary interpretation would have rendered the law
unconstitutional, whether or not the Court actually uses such
language (pp. 85–119). Many professors will have to revise their
lectures in light of Whittington’s scholarship. But he also
demonstrates that there were relatively few occasions for judicial
review, under any definition, because Congress just wasn’t passing
that much legislation to review. The cases Graber and
Whittington rely on are known to extremely few academics
because, frankly, they are not thought to be that important in
terms of the substantive issues raised. But, as sources of genuine
illumination of how judges were thinking during this period, they
are invaluable. As Whittington writes, “The practice of judicial
review was built up through the resolution of more mundane cases
[than those emphasized by most scholars] in which the political
stakes were relatively low” (p. 117).
Along with Dahl, Whittington is also assessing the all-tooinfluential argument of Yale Law School Professor Alexander
Bickel that the Court’s exercise of judicial review is “countermajoritarian,” in which the unelected judges substitute their
judgment for that of an ostensible majority.14 It is worth quoting
Whittington at some length, for it is a decisive rejoinder to the
more simplistic statements of Bickel’s thesis, which rests on the
clearly counterfactual assumptions that any act that receives a
majority of votes in Congress necessarily represents even the
strong endorsement of those voting “aye,” let alone that of their
constituents. Many cases, Whittington writes,
could benefit the individual litigant and clean up the processes
of government, but they had few larger policy ramifications.
They spoke to no serious ideological or partisan disputes and
disadvantaged no important political interests. They illustrated
the justices bringing their lawyerly expertise to bear in

13. HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOLUME II: RIGHTS & LIBERTIES (2d ed. 2016).
14. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
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resolving complex legal disputes. In doing so, they filled out the
constitutional rulebook and took note of when Congress had
stepped over the lines into foul territory. But such exercises of
the power of judicial review were countermajoritarian only in
the most formal sense of scrutinizing the work product of
elected legislators and correcting its deficiencies and of being
available to hear the complaints of individuals who were
dissatisfied with how the government had treated them. (pp.
142–43)

Harvard political scientist Kenneth Shepsle in 1992 famously
suggested that Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”15 What this means
is that political coalitions that pass legislation usually consist of
multiple viewpoints that might vote together on a given piece of
legislation; but for some members within the coalition, the
affirmative vote is far more a matter of being a good team player,
or recipient of a logrolling benefit with regard to legislation they
really care about, than a statement of deep principle. So this in
effect gives the Court some significant leeway to strike down even
relatively recent legislation, passed by the same coalition that
arguably placed the judges in office, at least so long as the
legislation doesn’t reflect a truly strong (and unified) party
position. This is one more genuine insight that will require
additional rewriting of lecture notes and revision of published
textbooks that adopt a more holistic view of ostensibly dominant
coalitions. This point is especially powerfully made with regard to
the cleavages within the Democratic Party regarding the passage
of an income tax, notoriously declared unconstitutional by the
Court in 1894.
Still, as Whittington notes on the very same page from which
the prior quotation comes, even these relatively “routine cases of
judicial review were also more likely than not to come out in favor
of the government” (p. 143). Constitutional challenges in fact
were rarely successful; “the Court has more often been a
handmaiden to the congressional exercise of power than an
obstruction” (p. 25). And, yet again, “the most striking feature of
the Court’s exercise of judicial review vis-à-vis Congress is how
mundane it seems to have been. History remembers the
highlights—the income tax cases, E.C. Knight, the child labor
case—but this was but a small part of the Court’s work and leaves

15. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
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a misleading impression of how judicial review was exercised.”16
As one would expect (and demand), Whittington includes
full discussions of the canonical “highlights,” including, of course,
the epic struggle between the “Old Court” and FDR over the
constitutionality of New Deal measures. But he is convincing in
his overall thesis, which is, simply put, that we overemphasize the
frequency of such cases and thus, concomitantly, overestimate the
extent to which the exercise of judicial review has genuinely been
highly controversial. At any given moment, as the political
scientist James Gibson argued in a, for me, unforgettable lecture
at the University of Texas Law School some years ago, it is highly
likely that a majority of the population will in fact support any
given decision. This is because, say, 35% of the population will
support ideologically the result reached by the Court, as was
probably true even during the New Deal shootout, given that
Kansas Governor Alf Landon received 36.5% of the popular vote
during FDR’s landslide victory in 1936; another, say, 20–25% of
the population might accord the Court what political scientists call
“diffuse support,” which boils down to the position, “I really don’t
know anything about the Constitution, and I trust the Supreme
Court to know what it is doing when it declares something
unconstitutional [or constitutional],” leaving only a probable
minority that truly offers vigorous opposition to the substance of
a Supreme Court decision. There may be some exceptions:
Roughly 90% of those polled have registered their opposition to
the 2010 decision of the Court in Citizens United,17 which
invalidated a century-old limitation on the ability of corporations
to participate directly in political campaigns, but efforts to
overturn the decision have gone nowhere. But it is possible that
Citizens United is exceptional, even if it is far more the subject of
scholarly attention, with regard to considering judicial review,
than the more mundane cases that get equal treatment.
Whittington concludes this true magnum opus by writing as
follows:
The Court has rarely stood for universally embraced and
historically enduring political principles, in part because there
are not very many such principles—or at least not very many
such principles that must be displayed to invalidate an action

16. Id. at 171.
17. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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of Congress. Congress rarely violates universally embraced and
historically enduring political principles. Congress does,
however, routinely violate principles that are more contested
and less enduring but that nonetheless command substantial
political support within a given historical era. When the Court
intervenes to vindicate those principles against an errant
national legislature, it is often doing the political work that
political leaders would like it to do. It is acting as a player
within democratic politics, but not simply as a constitutional
guardian standing outside of democratic politics.”18

Inevitably, readers may quibble with some of Whittington’s
specific judgments, particularly about what might be termed the
“objective importance” of certain instances of judicial
invalidation (or upholding questionable, albeit highly popular,
legislation). But that does not really abate my enthusiasm for the
book or lessen the encouragement of anyone interested in the
actualities of the American political system to read it and ponder
its findings carefully. The University Press of Kansas series within
which Whittington’s book appears is devoted to innovative
approaches to “constitutional thinking.” It fully deserves its
placement in the series and unequivocal admiration for the deep
scholarship it reveals. That it may also generate further argument
is only added testament to its importance.

18. WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 314.

